Click on the image below for the complete, unabridged presentation …
… or scroll down for an edited presentation in six short segments.
On Tuesday, April 23 at 5:30 Pacific Time, Charles Langley of Public Watchdogs, Gary Headrick of San Clemente Green, keynote speaker Paul Blanch, and Cathy Iwane, a Fukushima evacuee, were featured in a 90-minute Webinar by producer Doug Wood of Grassrootsinfo.org . The presentation focused on the nuclear radiation risks at the failed San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), and was broken into five brief presentations on a different aspect of safety.
|Source page for these videos|
|Part One – Charles Langley, Public Watchdogs|
|Part Two, Paul Blanch|
|Part Three, Cathy Iwane|
|Part Four, Paul Blanch|
|Part Five, Gary Headrick, San Clemente Green|
|Part Six, Panel Discussion, Questions and Answers|
Paul Blanch’s presentation notes from Part One are shown below:
Part One, Presentation by Paul Blanch
Thank you and good evening.
As a nuclear engineer with over fifty years of experience, I would say that the San Onofre Nuclear Station (SONGS) is probably the most dangerous nuclear power plant site in the USA. I am saying this as a lifetime advocate of safe nuclear power. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) mission is to “Protect the Public and the Environment.” This mission is allegedly accomplished by compliance and enforcement of the Federal Regulations.
I have been a qualified Reactor Operator, Instructor of reactor theory and operations, and a qualified nuclear electrician, and more than four years of formal nuclear education. Additionally, I received a BS degree in engineering and was a professional engineer (PE) in the State of California. I have participated in many Nuclear Decommissioning Boards (DOB) in the Northeast US.
The NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has issued at least three investigative reports validating my interactions with the NRC. All of these OIG reports substantiated my contentions that the NRC provided false information to me and to the public. The NRC continues this practice and we have been meeting with the OIG on an ongoing basis about the issues we will be discussing today. These OIG reports can be located on the NRC’s website.
I will be citing specific regulations from the Federal Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) but will not burden the audience with specific and confusing terms such as 10 CFR 72.122(l) etc. as these can be all found on the NRC’s website or Google.
Now, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the “NRC” has a responsibility and a mission to protect the “public and the environment.” But I’m sorry to say, that’s not happening here, and everyone in Southern California needs to know that, and know what the problems are. That’s my goal here tonight.
So the question before us tonight is: How can we make San Onofre decommissioning safer? We will never make it completely safe. But there are things we can do to make it safer than it is now. And it’s critical that we do that before it’s too late.
This photo is taken from the South of the plant.
The major issues we’ll be talking about tonight are:
- The potential flooding of San Onofre during a tsunami or major weather event and the unaddressed issue of potential “Criticality”, a clear requirement of the regulations
- The failures of political communication after the Fukushima accident and the transparency of failures of the NRC, Southern California Edison or “Edison” and Holtec about the true dangers at San Onofre
- The retrievability of the spent fuel
- The potential consequences should the NRC continue to ignore its regulations and Congressional mandate.
Here are some pictures demonstrating the proximity of San Onofre to the ocean, and the very likely possibility that in a severe storm or a tsunami, the area where the spent fuel is currently located, could become submerged in salt water. Keep in mind, the facility is in an earthquake zone, so the idea of a tsunami is not that remote. The wall that you see there is the only thing protecting the spent fuel containment area. This wall will not even protect against wave actions. One can also view the San Onofre one-foot-thick “sea wall.”
This photo taken last month in the Canary Islands is designed to protect a small harbor and small city. It is about 12 feet thick at to top and 50 feet at the bottom. This is also similar to the sea wall at Fukushima, which unfortunately did not consider the potential magnitude of historic tsunamis.
This photo from the owners of the plant, “Edison” shows the area that would be flooded in the event of a major weather event. As you can see, the area which is clearly marked is exactly where the spent fuel is presently being stored. So everyone knows this is a problem. The Storage Facility may be flooded at an ever-increasing frequency. Edison submitted this photo under oath to the NRC in 2013 and it has never been supplemented or withdrawn,
Now the NRC has decided that the possibility of a flood at San Onofre is not credible, so they don’t have to plan for flooding. The NRC’s documentation, actually says “flooding is excluded as an initiating event” in spite of Edison’s own analysis. And Holtec, the company subcontracted to Edison to decommission San Onofre, is classifying its analysis of flood potential as “proprietary information.”
How can information, critical to the safety of millions of people be classified as “proprietary?” It appears that Edison is hiding and withholding vital information.
Let me talk for a few minutes about the way the spent fuel is currently being stored and cooled at San Onofre, and why it could be a major problem in the event of a flood. This canister containment device is designed to keep the spent fuel cool. Here’s how it is designed to function
These 5/8-inch thick canisters, each containing more radioactive material than that released from either Fukushima or Chernobyl are located about 108 feet from the Pacific Ocean.
During normal operation, the airflow enters the top as shown by the blue arrows, and proceeds down the outside of the divider shell. From there, it passes through small passages estimated to be about 4 inches in height at the bottom, and due to the heat, rises and discharges, the heated air, thus cooling the canisters. The normal temperature on the outside of the canister is greater than 500°F. I expect the discharged air to be a few hundred degrees.
I have described the operation of the cask and cooling design during normal operations. It may function well in a dry, salt-free environment, however, at San Onofre, the life expectancy is limited and only carries a 25 years warranty.
There is a probability, as acknowledged by Edison andHoltec, that flooding may occur under storm conditions, and also due to the effect of a tsunami. Either of these events will result in the flooding of these vertical modules (VVM). In this event, water, and debris will inundate these modules filling all cooling paths and module voids.
Should this occur, Pacific seawater with, about 3% salt, will flood all voids in these modules. As clearly stated by the NRC and Holtec, the water will actually assist with canister cooling. When the water recedes, the seawater will rapidly boil off due to the heat of the spent fuel and the latent heat of the Vertical Ventilation Modules (VVM). In a few hours or minutes, all water will be boiled off leaving a few hundred pounds of solidified salts and other debris at the bottom of the modules.
This salt will totally inhibit all cooling to the spent fuel. Edison states they can remove this blockage, but thisstatement is false, especially for 73 canisters. Edison has not acknowledged having procedures or equipment in place remove blockages within 24 hours as required by the legally binding Technical Specifications (TS). This is not trivial and a very expensive endeavor. Nor has the NRC required such equipment or training for these procedures.The loss of canister heat removal has been analyzed by Holtec and the NRC however it assumes cooling will be restored within 24 hours, which cannot possibly be accomplished for even one canister.
The loss of heat removal for greater than 24 hours has never been analyzed and will result in exceeding fuel and canister design limits with unknown radiological consequences. It is also possible the materials designed to prevent criticality could be damaged.
Slide 11: The NRC has developed what they call a “Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a Dry Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Plant”. In this report, they project a dose of 360 millirems (mr) of radiation to the public extending out to 1 mile away. The maximum allowable dose to the public is 100 millirems, so we have a problem. And it means that everyone within the 1-mile radius would have to be relocated in a flooding event, just as they were at Fukushima.
Now the NRC hasn’t done, or hasn’t made public, any analysis of the exposure to the public beyond one mile. This is another reason why we need a site-specific analysis for a flooded and potentially breached spent fuel canister. The NRC has determined that such a breach is “not
credible,” but we believe it is very credible and requires a revised Emergency Evacuation Plan. And the time to develop that plan is now, not once we have an emergency on our hands.
Slide 12. Inadvertent Criticality
No commercial reactor in the world has ever experienced this type of event but it occurred at a military reactor (SL-1 in Idaho) in 1961 resulting in immediate fatalities and land still uninhabitable today.
September 1965 I commenced my first day at Admiral Rickover’s Navy Nuclear Power School. At that time I hardly knew the difference between a neutron and a crouton. On this first day, we were all gathered to view a classified video on the Army’s inadvertent criticality accident at the SL-1, which occurred in an Idaho desert. This accident produced a peak pressure of 10,000 psi and resulted in 3 immediate fatalities and an unspecified number of latent deaths. The amount of contaminated land has never been published, to my knowledge. We all understood the message!
Our instructor that day reminded us that we are not dealing with a cookie factory but a dangerous system if not understood, maintained, and operated in accordance with approved procedures, the results can be catastrophic.
Slide 13: “Federal Regulations for “Criteria for nuclear criticality safety” state in part:
“Spent fuel handling, packaging, transfer, and storage systems must be designed to be maintained subcritical for . . .handling, packaging, transfer and storage conditions and in the nature of the immediate environment under accident conditions.”
An “Inadvertent criticality” is not credible for inland sites but an unaddressed possibility at San Onofre, with unimaginable consequences. Once again, Edison fails to provide any realistic analysis of this event.
In its present analysis, Holtec states that criticality will not occur as long as the water in the canister water level is less than 95%, but fails to discuss total flooding, inferring that total flooding may result in multiple criticalities. We don’t know if this is the water level in the canister or the fuel, that are significantly different.
Holtec also uses a proprietary material (METAMIC TM) to absorb neutrons and prevent criticality. We have no information on this material and its ability to remain functional at temperatures during the loss of cooling and other events that exceed design limits. The required analysis must also consider this event and its consequences.
Slide 14: Thank you for listening and I will now turn the presentation back to Charles.
Cathy Iwane Presentation
Slide #1: Good evening, I’m Cathy Iwane. Tonight, I speak to you as someone who experienced first-hand, the Fukushima triple nuclear meltdowns in Japan. I’ll share a bit of what happened and the aftermath of the disaster to illustrate the importance of transparency, honesty & public dialogue by those in positions of authority.
Slide #2: As Paul mentioned, there’s 1800 tons of high-level nuclear waste stranded 108 feet from the Pacific Ocean at San Onofre. It’s not a power point anymore; it’s the San Onofre Nuclear Waste Site.
Slide #3: This isn’t just a San Onofre problem: There are more than 60 nuclear waste sites like this all over the US. Decades ago, the Department of Energy promised to collect all this high-level nuclear waste & consolidate it into a permanent national repository by 1998. They charged us taxpayers billions of dollars to develop Yucca Mountain into a repository. Yucca Mountain was canceled for geological and political reasons, but Dep’t of Energy kept the money. Now San Onofre & other waste sites are stuck with the waste, and the risk… without the money, and without consent!
Slide #4: The Japanese archipelago is roughly the same size as California, with a population of about 125 million people. When the tsunami hit Japan, our home town of Wakaura, Wakayama, a full 380 miles southwest of Fukushima, saw 500 citizens evacuate to the gymnasium of my daughters’ elementary school due to flooding & damage to their homes.
Slide #4A: Japanese Citizens were told by their government that they were in no immediate danger. But I found myself translating the US military and US Embassy order for Americans to evacuate Tokyo, which is 186 miles from Fukushima. I was shocked by the lack of transparency exhibited by the Japanese government. I evacuated from Japan after 25 years with my children to California, leaving my husband who worked to support us. Lack of transparency, lack of clarity and virtually no public engagement has cost Japan severely.
Slide #5: The Japanese economy has tanked: 12.1 trillion yen – the equivalent of $93 billion spent so far on the nuclear disaster, 300,000 people evacuated, 50,000 households were directly affected after radioactive material leaked into the air, soil & sea. Prime Minister Naoto Kan in power at the time, tells us that had it not been for the prevailing offshore wins sweeping half of the radioactivity out to sea, he would have had to evacuate Tokyo, a city of 14 million, creating war zone-like conditions. NEXT SLIDE
Slide #6: Living 380 miles from Fukushima at our home in Wakayama, since scintillators which measure radioactivity in foods cost though sand of dollars and were not readily available in 2011, we noticed our Geiger counter ringing with elevated radioactivity in mild, leafy greens and fish produced / harvested in northeast Japan. So, the movement to farm & eat locally became very important. It wasn’t the fear of irradiated food as much as the apathetic consciousness of teachers who told our daughters not to tell their friends why they had opted out of the school lunches with rice & milk sourced near Fukushima. Instead, they took a bento made daily by me, sourced with locally grown foods.
Slide #7: This is Takazushi Yama. The top of this mountain is the destination for evacuation from our girls’ school, Wakaura Elementary School, with the path going past our home. During the tsunamis we prepared water, bathrooms & toilet paper in the event that of the 400 kids evacuating, some would be in need.
Slide #8: After Fukushima blew the Japanese government started a campaign to pay cities all over the country to incinerate radioactive debris left over from the accident in unfiltered incinerators at waste centers. Burning radioactive debris to ash does NOTHING to decrease radiation dose; in fact, burning it spreads it around & CONCENTRATES it. This national campaign was sold to the people as ‘sharing the burden’ of Fukushima. My husband & I assembled a coalition to successfully prevent our city & prefectural governments to refuse burning this radioactive rubble at our local waste center which happens to be near schools and agriculture. When nearby Osaka city started burning radioactive debris, we made the difficult decision to take our daughters to California.
Slide #9: The Japanese government was deceptive as we witnessed lawmakers arbitrarily raise the standard for acceptable and quote, SAFE levels of radiation in foodstuffs. The Japanese parliament did this without producing any scientific studies or risk assessments to the public. Suddenly, Japanese politicians enacted standards which made it legal to give infants 2 times the previous levels determined for nuclear waste, in their powdered formula and other beverages.
Slide #10: In 2013, Prime Minister Abe enacted the State Secrets Law, which classified important security concerns. However, it also put whistle blowers & journalists at risk for 10 year prison sentences for seeking or publishing such information. The Japanese government denied this, but it’s common knowledge that reports about radioactive contamination were being scrubbed from social media. NEXT SLIDE
Slide #11: So what does Fukushima have to do with San Onofre? Everything! A report from the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace should make everyone think twice about the assurances of safety coming from the NRC. The report says, and I quote: “The Fukushima accident was preventable. Had the plant’s owner, Tokyo Electric Power Company and Japan’s regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency followed international best practices and standards, it is conceivable that they would have predicted the possibility of the plant being struck by a massive tsunami.”
Slide #12: The International Atomic Energy Commission concurred, stating: “When the flooding hit, the ‘tsunami walls’ made to protect the plant from such events were too low to prevent the sea water from entering the plant. The water’s strength destroyed some of the structures, end entered the diesel generator room – which was built lower and at a closer distance to sea level than other plants in Japan.”
So, the unthinkable happened. The event that wasn’t likely, happened. The thing that all the planners said would never happen, happened. And people died. And they’re still dying.
Slide #13: In 2012, I read this very important Geologic, Paleoseismic Study, authored by Gerald G. Kuhn. This study, backed by more than 20 independent geological reports, reveals a history of tsunamis along the coast south of San Onofre. The evidence shows tsunamis with wave heights of up to 300+ feet above the current perimeter of lagoons ad estuaries in North County, San Diego where the waste site is located, in an official tsunami inundation zone.
The author postulates that the offshore Newport-Inglewood Rose Canyon fault systems & submarine canyon landslides were responsible for these tsunamis. You would think that this high respected scientific study would be referenced in Southern California Edison’s licensing agreement for the waste site. But you would be wrong. This study was sent to the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but they buried it. It has been erased from their files. Nobody wants that smoking gun in their flea when something bad happens. So we have mineral markers at San Onofre, proof devastating tsunamis at the site, this is our memorial to tsunami devastation in Southern California. NEXT SLIDE
Slide #14: In Japan, we find a different kind of memorial. This a stone slab, often erected on Japan’s coastline warning future generations to protect them from tsunamis. The stone reads, “High dwellings are the peace & harmony of our descendants. Remember the calamity of the great tsunamis. Do not build any homes below this point.” This was the advice the dozen or so households of the village of Aneyoshi headed and their homes emerged unscathed from the Fukushima disaster that flattened low-lying communities elsewhere & killed thousands along Japan’s northeastern shore.
Slide #15: Many experts warned that Fukushima was vulnerable, just as we are doing here tonight regarding San Onofre. Dr. Katsuhiko Ishibashi, a seismologist & former member of Japan’s NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION argued in a 2007 report that the Daiichi plant was vulnerable to major earthquakes & tsunamis & that safety measures in place were inadequate.
The Japan SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS published a report in 2008 warning that Japan’s nuclear power plants were not sufficiently protected against earthquakes & tsunamis.
In Dr. Hiroaki Koide’s 2008 book, “Genpatsu no Shinjitsu” (The Truth about Nuclear Power Plants), co-authored by Jinzaburo Takagi, he argued that Japan’s nuclear power plant operators were not doing enough to ensure their safety.
A former nuclear engineer for Toshiba who worked on the design of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, MASASHI GOTO, criticized the design of its reactors & cooling systems. He argued that the reactors were too small & lacked the necessary safety features to prevent a catastrophic accident.
Slide #16: So… here we go again. San Onofre safety advocates have jumped through hoop after hoop to engage the NRC and the owners of San Onofre on ONE crucial point of contention: We need the NRC to provide the risk assessments showing how they would handle the nuclear waste act San Onofre in the event of a flood or tsunami.
As Mr. Blanch will demonstrate shortly, they can’t possibly meet the recommended procedures for an emergency at San Onofre. It’s not physically possible. And yet, there’s no Plan B onsite at San Onofre in case of an accident. Offsite emergency plans are null & void due to exemptions given to Southern Cal Edison. NEXT SLIDE
Slide #17: Here in California, we are experiencing extreme weather events which no scientists predicted: massive flooding with numerous sink holes, coastal bluff & cliff destruction, home devastation from storms, 8 feet of snow in Lake Tahoe earlier this spring, not to mention total blackouts & white-outs in communities surrounding Los Angeles.
These are things we’ve never seen before. Highly unusual weather events that we now need to prepare for. It’s high time the NRC engaged the public transparently on all of the climate change evidenced risks.
Slide #18: Thank you very much. I look forward to answering your questions during the Q&A; Charles, I hand it back to you.
End Cathy Iwane
PART TWO, Paul Blanch
Thank you again. This first photo illustrates the power of the Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of San Onofre
This part of my presentation is about the Federal Regulation that requires the Retrievability of the spent fuel at San Onofre.
Retrievability is one of the most vital aspects of the safe storage of spent fuel in the Storage Facility at San Onofre and other existing Storage Facility Sites.
Regulations in Part 72 on “ Retrievability” state:
“Retrievability. Storage systems must be designed to allow ready retrieval of spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and reactor-related GTCC[Greater Than Class C] waste for further processing or disposal.”
And the same Part 72 of the regulation states:
“Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writing, no interpretations of the meaning of the regulations in this part by any officer or employee of the Commission other than a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized as binding on the Commission.”
The regulations clearly define ” Spent Fuel ” as the fuel assemblies within the canisters.
Slide 3: The NRC with the assistance of industry lobbying groups has made every effort to change this regulation and avoid a major financial impact on utilities by a concerted effort to change the interpretation avoiding the long, formal rulemaking process described in Part 2 of the Regulations. Compliance would tens of millions to the decommissioning costs.
In direct conflict with the requirements of the law, the NRC has developed a “workaround.” With full knowledge, the NRC has essentially changed the intent of the Retrievability regulation to allow sites to meet this law by demonstrating that canister storage is acceptable without the ability to ever access the spent fuel, thus saving billions of dollars for the nuclear industry no need for a hot cell or a spent fuel pool. The NRC did all of this behind closed doors however, it was eventually published in the Federal Register which does not meet the requirements for formal rulemaking requirements.
Why should we care about “Retrievability”
The NRC knowingly violated its own regulations
Slide 4: Federal law requires that nuclear waste storage systems be designed to allow ready retrieval of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste for further processing or disposal. “Ready retrieval” means you can easily get to the spent fuel and move, inspect, and repair it if necessary. That’s the federal requirement, fuel Retrievability, not cask relocation.
Non-Compliance is not an option but forcing the NRC may take action may require a formal legal challenge.
Retrievability is required because:
Without this capability, we can never inspect, repair or transfer the fuel to a long-term facility. And.
- It is a Federal Law (Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and 10 CFR)
- It may be necessary for transportation from the present location
- Necessary for fuel inspection and repair
- Without Retrievability the risk to the public and future
generations is significantly increased
- Required for long-term geological disposal
- Required for possible reprocessing
Federal Regulations prohibit the NRC from changing or reinterpreting any regulations in 10 CFR 72, but this is nothing new to the NRC
In spite of this, the NRC has made significant changes to the Retrievability regulation and has not provided a “written interpretation by the General Counsel” that I am aware of.
This was done by the issuance of Industry Staff Guidance (ISGs 1, 2, and 3) thus totally changing the intent of the regulation on Retrievability.
This is a photo of the equipment required to move the canisters at San Onofre. As you can see in this picture, this is not a simple job. It takes extreme effort, time, equipment, personnel, and significant radiological exposure to workers to actually remove one of these canisters from its current location. So in the event of an emergency like a giant storm, there’s essentially no way for these things to be moved in a timely fashion. With encased salts and debris, the canisters may not be able to be removed from the VVM!
Holtec produced a “Final Safety Analysis Report” where it discusses the “PROCEDURES FOR UNLOADING THE HI-STORM UMAX SYSTEM IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL”
Apparently, Edison has no concerns the Spent Fuel Pools are planned to be demolished shortly. This conscious decision was approved by the California Coastal Commission (CCC) apparently with no knowledge and total disregard of the federal requirements but will significantly reduce decommissioning expenditures.
This is the most egregious example of Holtec, a subcontractor to Edison, lying to the NRC and the public by stating:
“If the MPC [Multi Purpose Canister] fuel cavity cannot be successfully returned to a safe, analyzed condition, the fuel must be placed in a safe condition in the spent fuel pool. The Completion Time is reasonable based on the time required to re-flood the MPC, cut the MPC lid welds, move the TRANSFER CASK into the spent fuel pool, remove the MPC lid, and remove the spent fuel assemblies in an orderly manner and without challenging personnel.”
“The HI-Storm 100 system, unloading procedures, describe the general actions necessary to prepare the MPC for unloading . . . Special precautions are outlined to ensure personnel safety during the unloading operations, and prevent the rest of the MPC over pressurization and thermal shock to the storage spent fuel assemblies.” Knowing there won’t be any spent fuel pools within 300 miles of San Onofre.
There are no provisions discussed to prevent thermal shock when the canister is submerged in cold water and the consequence are unknown.
The HI-Storm 100 system canister is nearly identical to the UMAX system
The NRC must take some type of enforcement for these false statements (but they won’t)
This part of the FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report) clearly requires “all cooling to all canisters must be restored within 24 hours or damage will occur.” We know this to be impossible and there will likely be a major release of radioactive material into the environment that may persist for years.(i.e. Fukushima and Chernobyl)
This is the cover page from the 671-page UMAX FSAR. This document must be totally revised to address compliance with a potential flooding issue, criticality, and retrievability.
Should this analysis conclude an unacceptable risk to the public, then Edison must consider installing a “Hot Cell” and constructing a hardened structure with thick-walled casks as will be shown in upcoming slides thus demonstrating Regulatory compliance to meet the Federal requirements for Flooding, Retrievability, and Criticality
We must demand Edison retain the Spent Fuel Pools until a suitable hardened structure is constructed as shown in the following photo.
Where do we go from here?
- Provide an accurate analysis for Flooding, Retrievability, and Criticality.
- Provide a hardened (seismic and tsunami resistant) structure with thick wall casks for flood, and tsunami protection, and a terrorist deterrent meeting the Federal Siting Requirements
- Continue our attempts to reestablish a dialog with the Chairman, Commissioners, Office of Public Affairs, NRC Staff, and NRC’s Inspector General Office
- Reiterate our numerous requests with the NRC’s technical staff for a public meeting per Commission Policy
- Update the Final Safety Analysis Report demonstrating compliance with all Federal regulations.
- Reevaluate Emergency Planning based on realistic accident dose rates
- Attempt to accelerate the NRC’s Inspector General’s investigation
- Retain the Spent Fuel Pool and/or install a “Hot Cell” demonstrating regulatory compliance for the short term.
Self-explanatory. Why does the NRC refuse to enforce its regulations? The answer is that no nuclear plants would be economical if the regulations were enforced.
Slide 14: Nothing will be done without public outcry.
Let your feelings be heard by your elected officials, letters to the news media, and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC personnel may also present tonight for this presentation, but we will not be putting them on the spot or asking them any questions at this time.
However, we will provide the opportunity to the NRC and Edison to provide a brief statement.
From my perspective, living 2500 miles from San Onofre, my family and I are “Safe” from this impending disaster. I may have had a different opinion if I were residing in Southern California.
I say this even after sleeping on a Nuclear Submarine for months on end, 100 feet from a “safe Navy nuclear power reactor.”
A special thanks to Doug Wood for his audio-visual expertise. We would not have been able to produce this presentation without his assistance.
We look forward to working toward mutual resolution of these significant safety issues, and re-iterate our invitations to the NRC, EDISON, and the Community Engagement Panel for productive, professional meetings in the near future.”
So these are just a few of the issues we’re facing right now at San Onofre. Thanks for your attention.
I now turn this back to Charles Langley for questions and closing comments.
Thank you for listening.